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OPINION

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
[*2] I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 2). Plaintiffs are two same-sex
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and two opposite-sex couples seeking to enjoin Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis from enforcing her own marriage
licensing policy. On June 26, 2015, just hours after the U.S. Supreme Court held that states are constitutionally required
to recognize same-sex marriage, Davis announced that the Rowan County Clerk's Office would no longer issue
marriage licenses to any couples. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015). Davis, an
Apostolic Christian with a sincere religious objection to same-sex marriage, specifically sought to avoid issuing licenses
to same-sex couples without discriminating against them. Plaintiffs now allege that this "no marriage licenses" policy
substantially interferes with their right to marry because it effectively forecloses them from obtaining a license in their
home county. Davis insists that her policy poses only an incidental burden on Plaintiffs' right to marry, which is
justified by the need to protect her own free exercise rights.
The Court held preliminary injunction hearings on July 13, 2015 and July 20, 2015. Plaintiffs April Miller, Karen
Roberts, Jody Fernandez, [*3] Kevin Holloway, Barry Spartman, Aaron Skaggs, Shantel Burke and Stephen Napier
were represented by William Sharp of the Americans for Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and Daniel Canon. Jonathan
Christman and Roger Gannam, both of the Liberty Counsel, and A.C. Donahue appeared on behalf of Defendant Kim
Davis. Rowan County Attorney Cecil Watkins and Jeff Mando represented Defendant Rowan County. Official Court
Reporters Peggy Weber and Lisa Wiesman recorded the proceedings. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the Court
submitted the Motion pending receipt of the parties' response and reply briefs. The Court having received those filings
(Docs. # 28, 29 and 36), this matter is now ripe for review.
At its core, this civil action presents a conflict between two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence. One is the fundamental right to marry implicitly recognized in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The other is the right to free exercise of religion explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Each party
seeks to exercise one of these rights, but in doing so, they threaten to infringe upon the opposing party's rights. The
tension between these constitutional concerns can be resolved by answering one simple [*4] question: Does the Free
Exercise Clause likely excuse Kim Davis from issuing marriage licenses because she has a religious objection to
same-sex marriage? For reasons stated herein, the Court answers this question in the negative.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs April Miller and Karen Roberts have been in a committed same-sex relationship for eleven years. (Doc. # 21
at 25). After hearing about the Obergefell decision, they went to the Rowan County Clerk's Office and requested a
marriage license from one of the deputy clerks. (Id. at 25-26). The clerk immediately excused herself and went to speak
with Kim Davis. (Id. at 28). When she returned, she informed the couple that the Rowan County Clerk's Office was not
issuing any marriage licenses. (Id.). Plaintiffs Kevin Holloway and Jody Fernandez, a committed opposite-sex couple,
had a similar experience when they tried to obtain a marriage license from the Rowan County Clerk's Office. (Id. at 36).
Both couples went straight to Rowan County Judge Executive Walter Blevins and asked him to issue their marriage
licenses. (Id. at 30-32, 36). Blevins explained that, under Kentucky law, a county judge executive can only issue
licenses when the elected county clerk is absent. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.240. Because Davis [*5] continued to
perform her other duties as Rowan County Clerk, Blevins concluded that she was not "absent" within the meaning of
the statute. (Id.). Therefore, he did not believe that he had the authority to issue their marriage licenses. (Id.).
Plaintiffs Barry Spartman and Aaron Skaggs also planned to solemnize their long-term relationship post-Obergefell. (Id.
at 42-44). Before going to the Rowan County Clerk's Office, they phoned ahead and asked for information about the
marriage licensing process. (Id.). They wanted to make sure that they brought all necessary documentation with them.
(Id.). One of the deputy clerks told the couple "not to bother coming down" because they would not be issued a license.
(Id.).
Seven neighboring counties (Bath, Fleming, Lewis, Carter, Elliott, Morgan and Menifee) are currently issuing marriage
licenses. (Doc. # 26 at 53). All are less than an hour away from the Rowan County seat of Morehead. (Id.). While
Plaintiffs have the means to travel to any one of these counties, they have admittedly chosen not to do so. (Doc. # 21 at
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38, 48). They strongly prefer to have their licenses issued in Rowan County because they have significant ties to that
community. (Id. at 28-29, 47). They live, [*6] work, socialize, vote, pay taxes and conduct other business in and around
Morehead. (Id.). Quite simply, Rowan County is their home.
According to Kim Davis, the Rowan County Clerk's Office serves as a "pass through collection agency" for the State of
Kentucky. (Doc. # 26 at 24-25). She and her six deputy clerks regularly handle delinquent taxes, oversee elections,
manage voter registration and issue hunting and fishing licenses. (Id.). A portion of the fees collected in exchange for
these services is used to fund the Office's activities throughout the year. (Id.). The remainder is remitted to the State.
(Id.).
Under Kentucky law, county clerks are also responsible for issuing marriage licenses.1 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
402.080. The process is quite simple. The couple must first go to the county clerk's office and provide their biographical
information to one of the clerks. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.100. The clerk then enters the information into a
computer-generated form, prints it and signs it. Id. This form signifies that the couple is licensed, or legally qualified, to
marry.2 Id. At the appropriate time, the couple presents this form to their officiant, who must certify that he or she
performed a valid marriage ceremony. Id. The couple [*7] then has thirty days to return the form to the clerk's office
for recording. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.220, 402.230. The State will not recognize marriages entered into without
a valid license therefor. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.080.

1 This task requires relatively few resources, at least in Rowan County. (Doc. # 26 at 24-30). Davis testified that her Office issued 212
marriage licenses in 2014. Marriage licenses cost $35.50. (Id.). Of that sum, the Office retains $21.17, and remits the remaining $14.33 to
the State. (Id.). Thus, Rowan County Clerk's Office made about $4,500, or roughly 0.1% of its annual budget, from issuing marriage licenses
in 2014. (Id.). Davis also estimated that the task of issuing marriage licenses occupies one hour of one deputy clerk's time per week. (Id.).
2 A couple is "legally qualified" to marry if both individuals are over the age of eighteen, mentally competent, unrelated to each other and
currently unmarried. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.010, 402.020(1)(a)-(d), (f).

The Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives ("KDLA") prescribes the above-mentioned form, which must be
used by all county clerks in issuing marriage licenses.3 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.100, 402.110. It is composed of three
sections, which correspond to the steps detailed above: (1) a marriage license, to be completed by a county [*8] or
deputy clerk; (2) a marriage certificate, to be completed by a qualified officiant; and (3) a recording statement, to be
completed by a county or deputy clerk. The marriage license section has the following components:
(a) An authorization statement of the county clerk issuing the license for any person or religious society authorized to perform
marriage ceremonies to unite in marriage the persons named;
(b) Vital information for each party, including the full name, date of birth, place of birth, race, condition (single, widowed, or
divorced), number of previous marriages, occupation, current residence, relationship to the other party, and full names of parents;
and
(c) The date and place the license is issued, and the signature of the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.100(1) (emphasis added).

3 Only one aspect of the form has changed since Obergefell--whereas the marriage applicants were once referred to as "Bride" and "Groom,"
they are now identified as "First Party" and "Second Party."

Davis does not want to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples because they will bear the above-mentioned
authorization statement. She sees it as an endorsement of same-sex marriage, which [*9] runs contrary to her Apostolic
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Christian beliefs. (Id. at 42). Four of Davis' deputy clerks share her religious objection to same-sex marriage, and
another is undecided on the subject. (Id. at 49). The final deputy clerk is willing to issue the licenses, but Davis will not
allow it because her name and title still appear twice on licenses that she does not personally sign. (Doc. # 29-3 at 7).
In the wake of Obergefell, Governor Beshear issued the following directive to all county clerks:
Effective today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all same sex marriages performed in other states and in Kentucky. In accordance
with my instruction, all executive branch agencies are already working to make any operational changes that will be necessary to
implement the Supreme Court decision. Now that same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a marriage license, the
Department of Libraries and Archives will be sending a gender-neutral form to you today, along with instructions for its use.

(Doc. # 29-3 at 11). He has since addressed some of the religious concerns expressed by some county clerks:
You can continue to have your own personal beliefs but, you're also taking an oath to fulfill the duties prescribed [*10] by law, and
if you are at that point to where your personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot fulfill your duties that you were elected
to do, th[e]n obviously an honorable course to take is to resign and let someone else step in who feels that they can fulfill those
duties.

(Doc. # 29-11). Davis is well aware of these directives. Nevertheless, she plans to implement her "no marriage licenses"
policy for the remaining three and a half years of her term as Rowan County Clerk. (Doc. # 26 at 67).
III. Standard of Review
A district court must consider four factors when entertaining a motion for preliminary injunction:
(1) whether the movant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm;
(3) whether an injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of such an injunction.

See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 1998). These "are factors to be balanced, and not prerequisites that
must be met." In re Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating further that these factors
"simply guide the discretion of the court").
IV. Analysis
A. Defendant Kim Davis in her official capacity
Plaintiffs are pursuing this civil rights action against Defendants [*11] Rowan County and Kim Davis, in her individual
and official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

This statute "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994) (internal
quotations omitted).
At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs seek to vindicate their constitutional rights by obtaining injunctive relief against
Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as Rowan County Clerk. Because official capacity suits "generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," one might assume
that Plaintiffs are effectively pursuing injunctive relief against Rowan County. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
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Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). However, Rowan County can only [*12] be
held liable under § 1983 if its policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation. Id. at 694.
A single decision made by an official with final policymaking authority in the relevant area may qualify as a policy
attributable to the entity. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482-83, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452
(1986). Whether an official acted as a final policymaker is a question of state or local law. Id. However, courts must
avoid categorizing an official as a state or municipal actor "in some categorical, 'all or nothing' manner." McMillian v.
Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997). They key inquiry is whether an official
is a "final policymaker [ ] for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue." Id. Accordingly, the
Court will focus on whether Davis likely acted as a final policymaker for Rowan County regarding the issuance of
marriage licenses.
While Davis is the elected Rowan County Clerk, subject to very little oversight by the Rowan County Fiscal Court,
there are no other facts in the record to suggest that she set marriage policy for Rowan County. After all, the State of
Kentucky has "absolute jurisdiction over the regulation of the institution of marriage." Pinkhasov v. Petocz, 331 S.W.3d
285, 291 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011). The State not only enacts marriage laws, it prescribes procedures for county clerks to
follow when carrying out those laws, [*13] right down to the form they must use in issuing marriage licenses. Id.; see
also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.080, 402.100. Thus, Davis likely acts for the State of Kentucky, and not as a final
policymaker for Rowan County, when issuing marriage licenses.
This preliminary finding does not necessarily foreclose Plaintiffs from obtaining injunctive relief against Davis. While
the Eleventh Amendment typically bars Plaintiffs from bringing suit against a state or its officials, "official-capacity
actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14,
105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). This narrow exception, known as the Ex Parte Young doctrine, permits a
federal court to "enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law." Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441,
52 L. Ed. 714 (1908)). "It rests on the premise--less delicately called a 'fiction,'--that when a federal court commands a
state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign immunity
purposes." Va. Office for Prot. and Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638, 179 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2011). Because
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Davis from violating their federal constitutional rights, this Court has the power to grant relief
under Ex Parte Young.4

4 In their reply brief, Plaintiffs argued that the Court need not decide whether Davis is a state actor or [*14] municipal policymaker in order
to grant injunctive relief. The Court's preliminary finding on this matter does not necessarily foreclose Plaintiffs from arguing the "municipal
policymaker" theory in the future. The Court simply seeks to ensure that it is indeed able to grant injunctive relief against Kim Davis in her
official capacity.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction
1. Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits
a. The fundamental right to marry
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This "due process" clause has both a procedural component and a substantive
component. See EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012). Procedural due process simply
requires that the government provide a fair procedure when depriving an individual of life, liberty or property. Id. By
contrast, substantive due process "protects a narrow class of interests, including those enumerated in the Constitution,
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those so rooted in the traditions of the people as to be ranked fundamental, and the interest in freedom from government
actions that 'shock the conscience.'" Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (6th Cir. 2014).
Although the Constitution makes no mention of the right to marry, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified [*15] it as a
fundamental interest subject to Fourteenth Amendment protection. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18
L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967) (striking down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes as violative of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). After all, "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. This right applies with equal force
to different-sex and same-sex couples. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015)
("[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.").
If a state law or policy "significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right[, it] cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S. Ct. 673, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1978). A state substantially interferes with the right to
marry when some members of the affected class "are absolutely prevented from getting married" and "[m]any others,
able in theory to satisfy the statute's requirements[,] will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they will in
effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry." Id. at 387 (invalidating a Wisconsin statute that required
individuals [*16] with child support obligations to obtain a court order before marrying).
However, "not every state action, 'which relates in any way to the incidents of or the prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to rigorous scrutiny.'" Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386). States may impose "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions
to enter into the marital relationship." Id. at 1135. If the statute does not create a "direct legal obstacle in the path of
persons desiring to get married" or significantly discourage marriage, then it will be upheld so long as it is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. Id. (quoting Zablocki 434 U.S. at 387-88 n. 12); see also Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47, 54 n.11, 98 S. Ct. 95, 54 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1977) (upholding a Social Security provision that terminated
secondary benefits received by the disabled dependent child of a covered wage earner if that child married an individual
who was not entitled to benefits).
The state action at issue in this case is Defendant Davis' refusal to issue any marriage licenses. Plaintiffs contend that
Davis' "no marriage licenses" policy significantly interferes with their right to marry because they are unable to obtain a
license in their home county. Davis insists that her policy does not significantly discourage Plaintiffs [*17] from
marrying because they have several other options for obtaining licenses: (1) they may go to one of the seven
neighboring counties that are issuing marriage licenses; (2) they may obtain licenses from Rowan County Judge
Executive Walter Blevins; or (3) they may avail themselves of other alternatives being considered post-Obergefell.
Davis is correct in stating that Plaintiffs can obtain marriage licenses from one of the surrounding counties; thus, they
are not totally precluded from marrying in Kentucky. However, this argument ignores the fact that Plaintiffs have strong
ties to Rowan County. They are long-time residents who live, work, pay taxes, vote and conduct other business in
Morehead. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Plaintiffs would prefer to obtain their marriage licenses
in their home county. And for other Rowan County residents, it may be more than a preference. The surrounding
counties are only thirty minutes to an hour away, but there are individuals in this rural region of the state who simply do
not have the physical, financial or practical means to travel.5

5 The median household income in Rowan County is $35,236 and 28.6% of the population lives [*18] below the poverty line. See United
States Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21205.html . For the entire state of Kentucky, the median household income
is $43,036 and 18.8% of the population lives below the poverty line. Id.
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This argument also presupposes that Rowan County will be the only Kentucky county not issuing marriage licenses.
While Davis may be the only clerk currently turning away eligible couples, 57 of the state's 120 elected county clerks
have asked Governor Beshear to call a special session of the state legislature to address religious concerns related to
same-sex marriage licenses.6 (Doc. # 29-9). If this Court were to hold that Davis' policy did not significantly interfere
with the right to marry, what would stop the other 56 clerks from following Davis' approach? What might be viewed as
an inconvenience for residents of one or two counties quickly becomes a substantial interference when applicable to
approximately half of the state.

6 See also Jack Brammer, 57 County Clerks Ask Governor for Special Session on Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, The Lexington Herald
Leader (July 8, 2015), http://www.kentucky.com/2015/07/08/3936545_57-kentucky-county-clerks-ask.html?rh=1 ; Terry DeMio, Boone,
Ky. Clerks Want Same-Sex License Law, Cincinnati Enquirer (July 9, 2015),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/local/northern-ky/2015/07/09/boone-clerk-wants-special-legislative-session-address-sex-marriage-issues-clerks/29919103/
.

As for her assertion [*19] that Judge Blevins may issue marriage licenses, Davis is only partially correct. KRS §
402.240 provides that, "[i]n the absence of the county clerk, or during a vacancy in the office, the county
judge/executive may issue the license and, in so doing, he shall perform the duties and incur all the responsibilities of
the clerk." The statute does not explicitly define "absence," suggesting that a traditional interpretation of the term is
appropriate. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ , (describing "absence"
as "a period of time when someone is not present at a place, job, etc."). However, Davis asks the Court to deem her
"absent," for purposes of this statute, because she has a religious objection to issuing the licenses. While this is certainly
a creative interpretation, Davis offers no legal precedent to support it.
This proposal also has adverse consequences for Judge Blevins. If he began issuing marriage licenses while Davis
continued to perform her other duties as Rowan County Clerk, he would likely be exceeding the scope of his office.
After all, KRS § 402.240 only authorizes him to issue marriage licenses when Davis is unable to do so; it does not
permit him to assume responsibility for duties that [*20] Davis does not wish to perform. Such an arrangement not only
has the potential to create tension between the next judge executive and county clerk, it sets the stage for further
manipulation of statutorily defined duties.7 Under these circumstances, the Court simply cannot count this as a viable
option for Plaintiffs to obtain their marriage licenses.

7 Even if the Court were inclined to accept Davis' interpretation of the term "absence," it would have doubts about the practicality of this
approach. Judge Blevins is the highest elected official in Rowan County. (Doc. # 26 at 7). He is frequently out of the office on official
business. (Id.). While Judge Blevins would not have to process a large number of marriage requests, he might not be regularly available for
couples seeking licenses. Thus, the Court would be concerned about Judge Blevins' ability to perform this function as efficiently as Davis
and her six deputy clerks.

Davis finally suggests that Plaintiffs will have other avenues for obtaining marriage licenses in the future. For example,
county clerks have urged Governor Beshear to create an online marriage licensing system, which would be managed by
the State of Kentucky. While [*21] these options may be available someday, they are not feasible alternatives at
present. Thus, they have no impact on the Court's "substantial interference" analysis.
Having considered Davis' arguments in depth, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have one feasible avenue for obtaining their
marriage licenses--they must go to another county. Davis makes much of the fact that Plaintiffs are able to travel, but
she fails to address the one question that lingers in the Court's mind. Even if Plaintiffs are able to obtain licenses
elsewhere, why should they be required to? The state has long entrusted county clerks with the task of issuing marriage
licenses. It does not seem unreasonable for Plaintiffs, as Rowan County voters, to expect their elected official to

Page 8
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105822, *21

perform her statutorily assigned duties. And yet, that is precisely what Davis is refusing to do. Much like the statutes at
issue in Loving and Zablocki, Davis' "no marriage licenses" policy significantly discourages many Rowan County
residents from exercising their right to marry and effectively disqualifies others from doing so. The Court must subject
this policy apply heightened scrutiny.
b. The absence of a compelling state interest
[*22] When pressed to articulate a compelling state interest served by her "no marriage licenses" policy, Davis
responded that it serves the State's interest in protecting her religious freedom. The State certainly has an obligation to
"observe the basic free exercise rights of its employees," but this is not the extent of its concerns. Marchi v. Bd. of Coop.
Educ. Serv. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 476 (2d. Cir. 1999). In fact, the State has some priorities that run contrary to
Davis' proffered state interest. Chief among these is its interest in preventing Establishment Clause violations. See U.S.
Const. amend. I (declaring that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion"). Davis has
arguably committed such a violation by openly adopting a policy that promotes her own religious convictions at the
expenses of others.8 In such situations, "the scope of the employees' rights must [ ] yield to the legitimate interest of
governmental employer in avoiding litigation." Marchi, 173 F.3d at 476.

8 Although it is not the focus of this opinion, Plaintiffs have already asserted such an Establishment Clause claim against Kim Davis in her
official capacity. (Doc. # 1 at 13).

The State also has a countervailing interest in upholding the rule of law. See generally Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972) ("The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities
as well as majorities, . . . is the great mucilage that holds society together."). Our form of government will not survive
unless we, as a society, agree to respect the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions, regardless of our personal opinions. Davis
is certainly free to disagree with the Court's opinion, as many Americans likely do, but that does not excuse her from
complying with it. To hold otherwise would set a dangerous precedent.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Davis' "no marriage licenses" policy likely infringes upon Plaintiffs' rights
without serving a [*23] compelling state interest. Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success
on the merits of their claim, this first factor weighs in favor of granting their request for relief.
2. Potential for irreparable harm to Plaintiffs
When a plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of a constitutional deprivation claim, it follows that
he or she will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief. See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't,
305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Courts have also held that a plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an injunction
will cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights."); see also
Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir .1998) (finding that the loss of First Amendment rights for
a minimal period of time results in irreparable harm); Ohio St. Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808,
851 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (recognizing that a restriction on the fundamental right to vote constitutes irreparable injury).
The Court is not aware of any Sixth Circuit case law explicitly stating that a denial of the fundamental right to marry
constitutes irreparable harm. However, the case law cited above suggests that the denial of constitutional rights,
enumerated or unenumerated, results in irreparable harm. It follows that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from
Davis' "no [*24] marriage licenses" rule, absent injunctive relief. Therefore, this second factor also weighs in favor of
granting Plaintiffs' Motion.
3. Potential for substantial harm to Kim Davis
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a. The right to free exercise of religion
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940)
(applying the First Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). This Free Exercise Clause "embraces two
concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act." Id. at 304. "The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be." Id. Therefore, "[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id.
Traditionally, a free exercise challenge to a particular law triggered strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 407, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). A statute would only be upheld if it served a compelling
government interest and was narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
retreated slightly from this approach. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct.
1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993). While laws targeting religious conduct remain subject to strict scrutiny, "[a] law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular [*25] religious practice." Babalu, 508 U.S. at 532; see also Smith, 494 U.S.
at 880 (stating further that an individual's religious beliefs do not "excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate").
"Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that
the other has not been satisfied." Babalu, 508 U.S. at 532. A law is not neutral if its object "is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation." Id. at 533 (finding that a local ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice
was not neutral because it focused on "rituals" and had built-in exemptions for most other animal killings). The Court
has not yet "defined with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application." Id. at
543. However, it has observed that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause 'protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment,'
and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being
pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation." Id. at 542.
While Smith and Babalu do not explicitly mention the term "rational basis," lower courts have interpreted them as
imposing a similar standard [*26] of review on neutral laws of general applicability. See, e.g., Seger v. Ky. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 453 F. App'x 630, 634 (2011). Under rational basis review, laws will be upheld if they are "rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest." Id. at 635 (noting that "[a] law or regulation subject to rational basis
review is accorded a strong presumption of validity"); see also F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113
S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993) (stating generally that laws subject to rational basis review must be upheld "if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification").
In response to Smith and Babalu, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). See 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1. It prohibits the government from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability," except when the government demonstrates that the burden is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Id. Although
Congress intended RFRA to apply to the states as well as the federal government, the Court held that this was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress' powers under Section Five of [*27] the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997). Free exercise challenges to federal laws remain
subject to RFRA, while similar challenges to state policies are governed by Smith. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014).
For purposes of this inquiry, the state action at issue is Governor Beshear's post-Obergefell directive, which explicitly
instructs county clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Davis argues that the Beshear directive not only
substantially burdens her free exercise rights by requiring her to disregard sincerely-held religious beliefs, it does not
serve a compelling state interest. She further insists that Governor Beshear could easily grant her a religious exemption
without adversely affecting Kentucky's marriage licensing scheme, as there are readily available alternatives for
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obtaining licenses in and around Rowan County.9

9 Davis further develops this argument in her own Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 39) against Governor Beshear and KDLA
Librarian Wayne Onkst. That Motion is not yet ripe for review.

This argument proceeds on the assumption that Governor Beshear's policy is not neutral or generally applicable, and is
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.10 However, the text itself supports a contrary inference. [*28] Governor Beshear
first describes the legal impact of the Court's decision in Obergefell, then provides guidance for all county clerks in
implementing this new law. His goal is simply to ensure that the activities of the Commonwealth are consistent with
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.

10 In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that free exercise claims involving neutral and generally applicable laws may still be subject
to heightened scrutiny if asserted alongside another constitutional right. If the Court concludes that the Beshear directive is neutral and
generally applicable, Davis argues that strict scrutiny must still apply because her free exercise claim is coupled with a free speech claim.
(Doc. # 29 at 23). However, this proposal fails because Davis' free speech rights are qualified by virtue of her public employment. See
Draper v. Logan Cnty. Pub. Library, 403 F. Supp. 2d 608, 621-22 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (applying the Pickering balancing test to a combined
free exercise and free speech claim asserted by a public employee). The Court will discuss this concept further in the next section.

While facial neutrality is not dispositive, Davis has done little to convince the Court that Governor Beshear's directive
aims to suppress religious practice. She has only [*29] one piece of anecdotal evidence to demonstrate that Governor
Beshear "is picking and choosing the conscience-based exemptions to marriage that he deems acceptable." (Doc. # 29 at
24). In 2014, Attorney General Jack Conway declined to appeal a federal district court decision striking down
Kentucky's constitutional and statutory prohibitions on same-sex marriage. (Doc. # 29-12). He openly stated that he
could not, in good conscience, defend discrimination and waste public resources on a weak case.11 (Id.). Instead of
directing Attorney General Conway to pursue the appeal, regardless of his religious beliefs, Governor Beshear hired
private attorneys for that purpose. (Doc. # 29-13). He has so far refused to extend such an "exemption" to county clerks
with religious objections to same-sex marriage. (Doc. # 29-11).

11 Davis refers to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky's decisions in Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545
(W.D. Ky. 2014), and Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (W.D. Ky. 2014). Judge John Heyburn held that Kentucky's constitutional
and statutory prohibitions on same-sex marriages "violate[ ] the United States Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law,
even under the most deferential standard of review." Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 544. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals [*30] consolidated
these cases with several similar matters originating from Ohio, Michigan and Tennessee and reversed them. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388
(6th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari on these cases, now collectively known as Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 190 L. Ed. 2d 908 (2015).

However, Davis fails to establish that her current situation is comparable to Attorney General Conway's position in
2014. Both are elected officials who have voiced strong opinions about same-sex marriage, but the comparison ends
there. Governor Beshear did not actually "exempt" Attorney General Conway from pursuing the same-sex marriage
appeal. Attorney General Conway's decision stands as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion on an unsettled legal
question. By contrast, Davis is refusing to recognize the legal force of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in performing
her duties as Rowan County Clerk. Because the two are not similarly situated, the Court simply cannot conclude that
Governor Beshear treated them differently based upon their religious convictions. There being no other evidence in the
record to suggest that the Beshear directive is anything but neutral and generally applicable, it will likely be upheld if it
is rationally related to a legitimate [*31] government purpose.
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The Beshear directive certainly serves the State's interest in upholding the rule of law. However, it also rationally relates
to several narrower interests identified in Obergefell. By issuing licenses to same-sex couples, the State allows them to
enjoy "the right to personal choice regarding marriage [that] is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy" and
enter into "a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals." 135 S. Ct. at
2599-2600. It also allows same-sex couples to take advantage of the many societal benefits and fosters stability for their
children. Id. at 2600-01. Therefore, the Court concludes that it likely does not infringe upon Davis' free exercise rights.
b. The right to free speech
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Under the Free
Speech Clause, an individual has the "right to utter or print, [as well as] the right to distribute, the right to receive and
the right to read." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965)(citing Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313 (1943)). An individual also has the "right to refrain
from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977) (invalidating a
state law that required New Hampshire drivers to display the state motto on their license plates). After all, "[a] system
which secures the right [*32] to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the
concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." Id.
While the Free Speech Clause protects citizens' speech rights from government intrusion, it does not stretch so far as to
bar the government "from determining the content of what it says." Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245-46, 192 L. Ed. 2d 274 (2015). "[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is
entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and carries
out its duties on their behalf." Id. That being said, the government's ability to express itself is not unlimited. Id. "[T]he
Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government's speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel
private persons to convey the government's speech." Id. (stating further that "[c]onstitutional and statutory provisions
outside of the Free Speech Clause may [also] limit government speech").
This claim also implicates the Beshear directive. Davis contends that this directive violates her free speech rights by
compelling her to express a message she finds objectionable. Specifically, Davis must issue marriage licenses bearing
her "imprimatur and authority" as Rowan County Clerk to same-sex couples . Doc. # 29 at 27). Davis views [*33] such
an act as an endorsement of same-sex marriage, which conflicts with her sincerely-held religious beliefs.
As a preliminary matter, the Court questions whether the act of issuing a marriage license constitutes speech. Davis
repeatedly states that the act of issuing these licenses requires her to "authorize" same-sex marriage. A close inspection
of the KDLA marriage licensing form refutes this assertion. The form does not require the county clerk to condone or
endorse same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds. It simply asks the county clerk to certify that the information
provided is accurate and that the couple is qualified to marry under Kentucky law. Davis' religious convictions have no
bearing on this purely legal inquiry.
The Court must also acknowledge the possibility that any such speech is attributable to the government, rather than
Davis. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (finding that specialty license plates are government speech because the
government has exercised final approval over the designs, and thus, chosen "how to present itself and its constituency").
The State prescribes the form that Davis must use in issuing marriage licenses. She plays no role in composing the form,
and she has [*34] no discretion to alter it. Moreover, county clerks' offices issue marriage licenses on behalf of the
State, not on behalf of a particular elected clerk.
Assuming arguendo that the act of issuing a marriage license is speech by Davis, the Court must further consider
whether the State is infringing upon her free speech rights by compelling her to convey a message she finds
disagreeable. However, the seminal "compelled speech" cases provide little guidance because they focus on private
individuals who are forced to communicate a particular message on behalf of the government. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943) (striking down a state law that required
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schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag). Davis is a public employee, and therefore, her
speech rights are different than those of a private citizen.12 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951,
164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006).

12 Most free speech cases involving public employees center on compelled silence rather than compelled speech. See, e.g., Connick, 461
U.S. at 147-48 (focusing on a district attorney's claim that she was fired in retaliation for exercising her free speech rights). "[I]n the context
of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term
necessarily comprising [*35] the decision of both what to say and what not to say." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 796-97.

"[T]he government may not constitutionally compel persons to relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of
public employment," but it does have "a freer hand in regulating the speech of its employees than it has in regulating the
speech of the public at large." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983); Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994). Accordingly, "[w]hen a citizen enters
government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." Garcetti, 547 U.S.
at 418; see also U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L.
Ed. 2d 796 (1973) (stating that "neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution" invalidates
the Hatch Act's bar on partisan political conduct by federal employees).
"[T]wo inquiries [ ] guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech." Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 563, 88 S.
Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968)). First, a court must determine "whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter
of public concern." Id. (explaining further that this question often depends upon whether the employee's speech was
made pursuant to his or her official duties). Id. at 421. If the answer is no, then the employee's speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection. Id. at 421 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the [*36] employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen."). If the
answer is yes, a court must then consider "whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public." Id. (stating further that the
government's restrictions "must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations").
The Court must adapt this test slightly because Davis' claim focuses on her right not to speak. In this context, the first
inquiry is whether Davis refused to speak (i.e. refused to issue marriage licenses) as a citizen on a matter of public
concern. The logical answer to this question is no, as the average citizen has no authority to issue marriage licenses.
Davis is only able to issue these licenses, or refuse to issue them, because she is the Rowan County Clerk. Because her
speech (in the form of her refusal to issue marriage licenses) is a product of her official duties, it likely is not entitled to
First Amendment protection. The Court therefore concludes that Davis is unlikely to succeed on her compelled speech
claim.
c. The prohibition on religious tests
Article VI, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:
The Senators and Representatives [*37] before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Under this Clause, "[t]he fact [ ] that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for
barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81
S. Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1961) (striking down a state requirement that an individual declare his belief in God in
order to become a notary public); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 1322, 55 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1978)
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(invalidating a state law that prevented religious officials from serving in the state legislature).
Davis contends that "[c]ompelling all individuals who have any connection with the issuance of marriage licenses . . . to
authorize, approve, and participate in that act against their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage, without
providing accommodation, amounts to an improper religious test for holding (or maintaining) public office." (Doc. # 29
at 20). The Court must again point out that the act of issuing a marriage license [*38] to a same-sex couple merely
signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements to marry. It is not a sign of moral or religious approval. The
State is not requiring Davis to express a particular religious belief as a condition of public employment, nor is it forcing
her to surrender her free exercise rights in order to perform her duties. Thus, it seems unlikely that Davis will be able to
establish a violation of the Religious Test Clause.
Although Davis focuses on the Religious Test Clause, the Court must draw her attention to the first half of Article VI,
Clause § 3. It requires all state officials to swear an oath to defend the U.S. Constitution. Davis swore such an oath
when she took office on January 1, 2015. However, her actions have not been consistent with her words. Davis has
refused to comply with binding legal jurisprudence, and in doing so, she has likely violated the constitutional rights of
her constituents. When such "sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose
own liberty is then denied. " Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. Such policies simply cannot endure.
d. The Kentucky Religious Freedom Act
Kentucky Constitution § 1 broadly declares that [*39] "[a]ll men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned . . . [t]he right of worshiping Almighty God according to
the dictates of their consciences." Kentucky Constitution § 5 gives content to this guarantee:
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of
worship or system of ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, to contribute to the
erection or maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or support of any minister of religion; nor shall any man be compelled to
send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person
shall be taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or
teaching. No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.

Kentucky courts have held that Kentucky Constitution § 5 does not grant more protection to religious practice than the
First Amendment. Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Ky. 2012). Such a finding would normally
permit the Court to collapse its analysis of state and federal constitutional [*40] provisions. However, the Kentucky
Religious Freedom Act, patterned after the federal RFRA, subjects state free exercise challenges to heightened scrutiny:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's freedom of religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by
a sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence
that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means
to further that interest. A "burden" shall include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion
from programs or access to facilities.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.350.
Davis again argues that the Beshear directive substantially burdens her religious freedom without serving a compelling
state interest. The record in this case suggests that the burden is more slight. As the Court has already pointed out, Davis
is simply being asked to signify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry. The State is not asking her to
condone same-sex unions on moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from engaging in a variety of religious
[*41] activities. Davis remains free to practice her Apostolic Christian beliefs. She may continue to attend church twice
a week, participate in Bible Study and minister to female inmates at the Rowan County Jail. She is even free to believe
that marriage is a union between one man and one woman, as many Americans do. However, her religious convictions
cannot excuse her from performing the duties that she took an oath to perform as Rowan County Clerk. The Court
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therefore concludes that Davis is unlikely to suffer a violation of her free exercise rights under Kentucky Constitution §
5.
4. Public interest
"[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights." G & V Lounge, Inc. v.
Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F. 3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). Because Davis' "no marriage licenses" policy likely
infringes upon Plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry, and because Davis herself is unlikely to suffer a violation of her
free speech or free exercise rights if an injunction is issued, this fourth and final factor weighs in favor of granting
Plaintiffs' Motion.
V. Conclusion
District courts are directed to balance four factors when analyzing a motion for preliminary injunction. In this case, all
four factors weigh in favor of granting the requested relief. Accordingly, [*42] for the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 2) against Defendant Kim Davis, in her
official capacity as Rowan County Clerk, is hereby granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as Rowan County Clerk, is hereby
preliminarily enjoined from applying her "no marriage licenses" policy to future marriage license requests submitted by
Plaintiffs.
This 12th day of August, 2015.
Signed By:
/s/ David L Bunning
David L Bunning
United States District Judge

